This paper presents a calculus that supports information-ow security policies and certicate-based declassication. The decentralized label model and its downgrading mechanisms are concisely expressed in the polymorphic lambda calculus with subtyping (System F ). We prove a conditioned version of the noninterference theorem such that authorization for declassication is justied by digital certicates from public-key infrastructures.
Introduction
Information-ow policies constrain the propagation of condential data and provide an end-to-end guarantee of security. Security-typed languages have become a promising approach for specifying and enforcing such policies with static type systems [24] . However, designing a safe and secure information-ow type system is still a challenging problem: programmers want to express ne-grained security policies with advanced types, but reasoning about security guarantees in such complex systems is non-trivial.
This paper presents a security-typed language with well-studied constructs from the polymorphic lambda calculus with subtyping (System F " ) [8] . Language features such as labels, eects and divergence are isolated in a monadic style. This design makes typing and evaluation rules easy to understand and the proofs of type-safety and noninterference modular.
Another challenge of designing a security-typed language is to provide downgrading mechanisms that intentionally break the security guarantees, as long as such actions can be justied externally. Downgrading mechanisms, such as delegating to another principal or declassifying secret data, are important in practical programming [32] . The decentralized label model by Myers and Liskov [17] addresses this problem and introduces the notions of principals and reader sets to statically track the authority for downgrading.
One of our design decisions is to treat labels, principals and downgrading privileges uniformly as types so that the decentralized label model can be integrated easily into our language. For example, subtyping naturally models principal delegation, while intersection and union types give rise to principal groups and label renements. A security language with these encodings allows expressive, decentralized policies, yet the semantics remains easy to understand.
Our previous work [28] connects the static security type system with runtime security mechanisms such as public-key infrastructures. The language there uses singleton types such that a principal can be represented as a public key, and that the authority of a principal granting a privilege is represented as a digital certicate.
As an example of an information-ow policy permitted by run-time principals, consider this program that manipulates data condential to both a root superuser and to less privileged users: This program, written in the typed lambda calculus notation, displays a Boolean on the terminal. The run-time principal userid represents the user that initiated the program, and the abstract certicate c represents the access privilege of the principal. These values are dynamically determined and passed to the main function. Note that user is a type variable, while userid is a term variable, and they are connected via the typing rule for singleton types (userid:'user).
The rst function print (with its body elided) illustrates how a type system constrains information-ows using labels. The argument to the print method is a Boolean x that has the security label froot :userg. In the decentralized label model [17] , this annotation indicates that x is owned by the principal root (the top principal) and that the policy of root is that only user himself can read the contents of x. That is, since any principal is less privileged than root, the argument to print can be owned by anyone (unconstrained), but the argument must be readable by someone less privileged than user. This policy annotation might be appropriate when the Booleans passed to the print method are output on a terminal visible to the principal user. More importantly, condential information such as root's password, which user is not permitted to see, cannot be passed to the print method (either directly or indirectly). Here, root is a principal constant (a xed value determined at compile time), and user is a principal variable (a dynamic value to be determined at run time). The type system of the programming language enforces such information-ow policies at compile time without run-time penalty.
The second function print root method illustrates how run-time principals can allow for more expressive security policies. This method also takes a Boolean as input but, unlike print, requires the string to have the label froot : rootg, meaning that the data is owned and readable only by the principal root and principals that act for root. The body of this method performs a run-time test (if (c ) 'root / userid)) to determine whether the user principal that has initiated the program is in fact acting for the root principal. If so, then x is printed to the terminal, which is secure because the user has the privileges of root; otherwise, x is not printed. Formally, the run-time test introduces a static subtyping constraint root / user such that the label subtyping froot :rootg " froot : userg holds for the function application print x. Without such a runtime test, an information-ow type system would prevent a boolfroot : rootg term from being sent to the print routine because it expects a boolfroot : userg term. Run-time principals allow such security policies that depend on the execution environment.
We improve on our previous work by using monads and subtyping, allowing us to prove a conditioned version of noninterference even in the presence of declassication (which was neither stated nor proved before). In particular, we formalize downgrading mechanisms such as delegation and declassication as subtyping, and certicate verication as extending the subtyping relation. More importantly, the conditioned noninterference now captures the intuition that certicates externally justify the information leaks due to declassication.
The main contributions of our paper are:
1. the design of a safe and secure information-ow type system with bounded quantication, eects and divergence in a monadic style;
2. the integration of the decentralized label model with type constructors and the use of subtyping to model delegation, declassication, and endorsement;
3. a conditioned version of the noninterference theorem that justies certicatebased declassication.
The work here subsumes our previous work [28] , adding existential types, run-time labels and privileges, and a conditioned noninterference theorem for the full language. We have also built a prototype interpreter called Apollo 1 .
For brevity, the main body of this paper only shows the interesting cases of rules and proofs. The full details can be found in the appendix. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a core calculus with labels to study noninterference and extends it with eects and divergence. Section 3 introduces the decentralized label model and shows how the core calculus supports the notion of principals, condentiality and integrity. Furthermore, downgrading mechanisms are studied as subtyping, and certicatebased declassication is justied using constructs from public-key infrastructures. The paper then discusses related work in Section 5 and concludes in Section 6.
Core label calculus
Let us start by introducing a core calculus with monadic labels, eects and divergence for analyzing program dependency. This section proves two important security theorems, type-safety and noninterference, for our core calculus.
Monadic labels
The rst part of our label calculus is based on the dependency core calculus (DCC) [1] and the polymorphic lambda calculus with subtyping (System F " ) [8] . The motivation behind DCC is to use monadic labels as a unifying framework to study many important program analyses such as binding time, information ow, slicing, and function call tracking. DCC uses a lattice of monads and a special typing rule for their associated bind operations to describe the dependency of computations in a program.
Unlike DCC, which is based on the call-by-name simply-typed lambda calculus, our core calculus is based on the call-by-value F " . Our work should apply also to call-by-name languages; we pick call-by-value semantics simply because of their familiarity. The features of F " will become essential in later sections: bounded quantication (V " tXt and W " tXt) are used to connect static security policies and run-time public-key infrastructures (Sect. 3.3), and subtyping is used to model principal delegations and policy renements (Sect. 3.1).
The following grammar denes the syntax for our basic types and terms:
t ::= <> j c j <tY t> j t + t j t !t j b k j c k j j V " tXt j The types consists of unit, constants, products, sums, functions, top, bottom, variables, universal and existential quantication, while the terms consists of unit, products, projections, injections, cases, variables, functions, applications, type abstractions and instantiations, and package packings and openings. We also encode Booleans bool using unit and sums. The types top b k and bottom c k are annotated by a kind k: types , labels v, principals , and privileges t . Principals and privileges will be explained in Sect. 3 with the decentralized label model. One of our design choices is to identify these syntactic classes (types t, labels , principals p, and privileges j): t p j k ::= j v j j t This design allows the reuse of type machinery, such as polymorphism and subtyping, uniformly for these constructs. We will see this benet again for intersection and union types in Sect 3.1, and singleton types in Sect. 3.3.
We use the semantics of Kernel F " [8] . he constant type c models constant principals, constant labels, or constant privileges, known statically at compile time. We assume that the subtyping relation consists of rules for the ordering of these constants.
We assume familiarity of the standard F " constructs (see Pierce's exposition [20] for a good reference). Here, we focus on the new types and terms for labels: monadic types tfg (indexed by labels ), and their corresponding units mfg and bind operator. Note that these typings are standard for monadic types, except that the return type of bind here has type t 2 , rather than the expected type t 2 fg. Instead, by connecting the subtyping of labels (¡ 1 " 2 ) with the subtyping of types (¡ t 1 " t 2 ), the following label protection judgment ¡ ( t ensures that the result of bind still protects the data: Operationally, the label monad mfg evaluates the term inside until it is a value vfg, while bind evaluates m 1 to a value vfg and substitutes v for x in m 2 . We specify the dynamic semantics by the following syntactic classes of values v and evaluation contexts E [31] , and by small-step computation rules. The denitions of v and E for the standard constructs are shown in the appendix; here the denitions are extended for labels and binds. We use mfvaxg to denote the capture-free substitution of v for x in m.
v ::= X X X j vfg E ::= X X X j Efg j bind x = E in m bind x = vfg in m -! mfvaxg (E-Bind)
Security theorems
Before we go on to enrich the language with features such as eects, xpoints, and the decentralized label model, let us state and prove two important theorems that guarantee the security of programs written in our language. These theorems still hold for our full languages (modulo some condition to account for declassication, to be explained in Sect. 3.3); however, we prove them here for the core calculus rst to demonstrate the proof techniques. By presenting and proving for the full language incrementally, we hope to substantiate our claim that monadic types make the design and proofs more modular.
The rst theorem is the type-safety of the language, which we have proved using the progress and preservation theorems. Type-safety states that a closed, well-typed program will not get stuck or generate any error. A closed program means that both the type and term contexts are empty, that is, ¡ = = ¡. Proof. By induction on the typing derivation [8, 1] .
The second theorem is the noninterference property of the language [24] , which states that if a program is well-typed, a low-level observer cannot distinguish between dierent high-level computations. The theorem requires a model of observers for specifying what information leaks are possible. Our model here is that, given an equivalence relation over values of the same type, a welltyped observer cannot distinguish equivalent values, which are parameterized by the security label of the observer.
For example, we should have these equivalences for Booleans: The rst two say that an observer cannot distinguish true from true, but an observer can tell the dierence between true and false. More interestingly, the third says that if values are protected inside the high monad, then dierent values become indistinguishable to the low-level observer L.
Based on the intuition above, we generalize the equivalence relation in the following ways: (1) extend the relation to be higher-order, to account for functions; (2) parameterize the relation with arbitrary labels; (3) cover all types and values in the relation; and, (4) lift the relation from values to terms by evaluation.
The logical equivalence relation is formally dened in Figure 1 . We denote the equivalence relation for closed values at closed type t by v v : t, and that for closed terms by m % m : t. The type annotations inside the pack terms are elided for readability. We slightly abuse the notation by using V both for the object-level quantication types V " tXt and for the meta-level quantication in logical relations. Note that we do not deal with parametricity of polymorphic functions [30] nor the behavioral equivalence of existential packages [21] . Our model assumes that an observer can dierentiate dierent representations of polymorphic functions or dierent implementations of existential packages. That is, the type instantiations for V " t in R-All are the same, and so are the packed types for 8 A judgment j = ¡ says that a type substitution models a type context: for all P dom() = dom(¡), if () = t 1 and " t 2 P ¡, then t 1 is closed, has the same kind as t 2 , and ¡ t 1 " t 2 . Another judgment 1 2 : ( ) says that two term substitutions are equivalent under a term context of closed types: for all x P dom( 1 ) = dom( 2 ) = dom(( )), if 1 (x) = v 1 , 2 (x) = v 2 and x :t P ( ), then v 1 v 2 : t.
With the logical relations and the substitutions above, we can formally state the main theorem of the core label calculus: related substitutions preserve the logical equivalence. In other words, an arbitrary observer cannot distinguish values higher in the lattice. Proof. By induction on ¡ ( t. Since () T " , the rule R-Lab2 can always be applied for protected terms.
Monadic eects
We now turn to study information ows in the presence of computational eects. Practical programs interact with external systems and produce eects; observers can then learn high-security values from those eects. To prevent information leaks through such channel, we need to rene the type system with eect types.
We again use the monadic style of eect types [15, 7] . The benet of monads is that the new feature can be incrementally added to the language we have shown so far. That is, all the typing and evaluation rules in Section 2.1 remain unchanged. Traditional approaches, in contrast, require tracking of eects in all typing rules, spreading the interaction of labels and eects everywhere. Monads also help in structuring proofs in a modular way, which will be explained for Theorem 7.
For lazy languages like Haskell, we can simply add the IO monad. For eager languages like the one here, we need to introduce a new syntactic class e for eectful expressions to distinguish from pure terms m introduced in Sect. 2.1:
The expression return m has no eect and hence its type is given the empty eect H. We interpret the eect at H to be visible to no-one, while the eect at L to be visible to everyone. The expression run x = m in e executes the encapsulated eect of m, and then continue with e. Both m and e have the same eect type ; otherwise, the subsumption rule of subtyping can be used.
The rule T-E simply connects the typing judgments of terms and expressions. The rule P-E, on the other hand, is an additional label protection judgment (dened in Sect. 2) for eect types. The rule says that the underlying type must protect the label and the computation must generate eects higher than the label. In other words, once the program has bound high-security data, it may not produce low observable eects.
Example 5. The expression run z = (bind y = x in if y then c!H else c!L) in z where c return <> and x :boolfHg, is insecure. This is a typical example of implicit information ow through program counter in the literature [24] , where a program leaks information about a high-security Boolean through side eects.
The evaluation judgment for expressions is e --! e, where is the side eect during such step. We use u to denote the values for expressions: u ::= return v v ::= X X X j e! E ::= X X X j return E j run x = E in e j run x = (return E)! in e run x = (return v)! in e --! efvaxg (E-Run)
Since the congruence rules for expressions have no computational eects, we can still use evaluation contexts E to describe the evaluation order of expressions. The term e! is a value because it is a closure that delays computation. The rules on the top simply connect the term equivalence and the expression equivalence. Expressions are equivalent, the bottom rule says, if they produce the same number of eects visible to the observer and halt at equivalent values.
To formalize such equivalence, we rst classify evaluation steps into those that are visible Having rened our observer model as above, we proceed to proving noninterference for our core calculus with expressions. The main idea is to track the number of visible eects produced during the evaluation.
Note that the following proof is complete yet short in length. Since the proof is by induction on the typing derivation, monadic types allow an incremental proof, because the original proof for Theorem 3 remains valid and requires only a simple extension for e!. Here we can focus merely on the new typing rules for return e and run x = m in e. 
Fixpoints and divergence
The last feature we add to the core label calculus is xpoints, which are important for recursive programming. Programs with xpoints may diverge and our observer model cannot assume termination for testing the equivalence of terms any more (R-Term and R-Exp). Moreover, eects and divergence interact; an observer can distinguish an innite loop with no eects from another loop that keeps producing eects. Again, our strategy is to extend our type system and equivalence relation to account for divergence in the presence of eects.
Based on ideas from DCC [1] , we add xpoints fix m and pointed types t y to our core calculus in a call-by-value setting. Fixpoints for expressions fix xXe allows us to write recursive programs producing eects [16] . The metavariable x is now overloaded to be both term variables and expression variables, and thus typing contexts are extended to handle typing for expression variables Y x :t!. The label protection rule for pointed types (see below) allows a choice between strong noninterference and weak noninterference, which determines whether the observer model is termination-sensitive. For both versions of noninterference, two terms are equivalent if they halt at equivalent values, or they both diverge. If one term halts while the other does not, the two terms are equivalent under weak noninterference, but not strong noninterference.
Therefore, strong noninterference is termination-sensitive and implies weak noninterference, which is termination-insensitive. A pointed type does not protect any label at all under strong noninterference; weak noninterference, on the other hand, permits the following label protection rule:
According to the discussion above, more rules for the value and the term equivalences are added, as shown in Figure 3 Since our language with xpoints are no longer normalizing, we now interpret the rules R-Term in Sect. 2.1 and R-Exp in Sect. 2.3 coinductively and treat % as the largest relation that is compatible with those rules [9] . Theorem 9 (Noninterference with xpoints). Proof sketch. Here we give the intuition behind the proof; the full proof can be found in the appendix. The idea is to strengthen the coinductive hypothesis by dening another equivalence : % that is compatible with the same set of rules dened above but also relates diverging terms and is closed under related substitutions of closed values. Since % is the largest relation that is compatible with these equivalence rules by denition, and : % % by construction, it follows that : % = % . This proof is similar to bisimulation proofs in process calculi but our language here is deterministic. The key step is nding the appropriate strengthening of related substitutions; for instance we must relate term xpoints as follows (and similarly for expression xpoints): Having established the security property of our core calculus, we now investigate how to make the policy sublanguage more expressive. The key challenge is to extend the policy language in a modular way, reusing the type machinery from the core as much as possible. This section shows how the decentralized label model by Myers and Liskov [17] can be integrated into our core label calculus. Decentralized labels allow different principals to individually specify ne-grained security policies such as condentiality and integrity. Combined with singleton types, this extended calculus draws a connection between compile-time dependency analyses and the run-time infrastructure. The benet is twofold: (1) security policies can now be specied in term of information not known until execution, such as run-time user identities or le access permissions; (2) certicates can be used to regulate declassication and to justify a conditioned version of the noninterference theorem.
Condentiality and integrity
In the decentralized label model, condentiality policies specify which principals allow which other principals to read some data, while integrity policies specify which principals trust some data [12] . These policy constructors, or label constructors, provide a ner-grained control of security specication than the label terms introduced in Sect. 2.1.
To model these policies, we treat principals p as abstract types and treat principal delegation p 1 " p 2 as subtyping. That is, p 1 is a subtype of p 2 whenever p 1 delegates to p 2 (or, p 2 acts for p 1 ). We also introduce two new label constructors, R (read) and T (trust), for condentiality and integrity:
::= X X X j R p p j T p j ^ j _ s ::= X X X j R¨¨j T © j¨^¨j¨_1 8 A label R p 1 p 2 species the policy that a data is owned by p 1 and that p 1 allows p 2 to read the data, while a label T p species that the data is trusted by p. Moreover, we add intersection ^ and union types _ [4] to precisely model policy sets. Since labels and principals p are in the same syntactic class, these two constructors can also model principal groups as p^p and p _ p.
Intersection and union types in this paper are used only for labels, principals, and privileges, but not for ordinary types; hence, our language does not have introduction or elimination terms for intersections and unions. This decision helps keeping the static and the dynamic semantics of our language simple.
We need both intersection and union types because the two label constructors have dierent subtyping polarities: R is covariant, while T is contravariant. Having both intersections and unions gives a natural interpretation of principal sets, so we can make use of the following syntactic abbreviations: 
Downgrading as subtyping
The rest of the section discusses various downgrading mechanisms that intentionally leak information [32] . These mechanisms include:
1. declassifying some data to a lower label, 2. a principal delegating to other principals, 3 . a principal declassifying some data to other principals for reading, and 4. a principal endorsing the integrity of some data.
The decentralized label model is essential for the last three mechanisms because each concerns a particular principal. In Sect. 3.3 we will see how a public key, which represents the concerned principal, can be used to verify a digital certicate, which represents the authority for downgrading.
The innovation here is to model downgrading as subtyping. The motivation is that downgrading can be made implicit through the subsumption rule of subtyping, if the concerned principal explicitly introduces the authority into the context. This contrasts with the usual approach [17] that uses coercion constructs like declassify p m and endorse p m for declassication and endorsement. Both approaches ensure that the authority of the concerned principal is granted before declassication. Our implicit approach, however, allows a simple formulation of certicate-based declassication (to be shown in Sect. 3.3).
Foremost, we extend the type context ¡ to maintain authority, which is a set of authorizations of the form p / j (a principal p granting some privilege j):
¡ ::= X X X j ¡Y p / j j ::= X X X j del p j dcls p j endr s ::= X X X j del¨j dcls¨j¨% © /ẗ ::= X X X j t % p / j m ::= X X X j grant p / j in m j pass x = m in m
The three predened privileges are delegation (del p), declassication (dcls p), and endorsement (endr), corresponding to downgrading for principal subtyping, condentiality and integrity, respectively. Now, the downgrading mechanisms can be concisely expressed using these additional subtyping rules:
An authority type t % p / j (a type t annotated with the authority of a principal p granting some privilege j) tracks the eects of declassication on the lattice so that later theorems can be stated in terms of the authority: These rules are very close to the typing and evaluation rules for standard monadic types, except that the type context ¡ is now extended with p / j. The value v in the term grant p / j in v may capture the constraint p / j, and hence, to ensure type preservation, grant p / j in v is regarded together as a value.
As a pleasant bonus of monadic analysis, checking the robustness condition of downgrading reduces to adding one condition in the label protection rule ¡ ( t in Sect. 2.1. In particular, robust declassication says that the program context of a declassication operation should be trusted by the owner of the data [32] . The following rule generalizes the robustness condition to any downgrading mechanism. The intuition is that, for robust downgrading, when p 2 authorizes some privilege j, the program context should have trust (T p 1 ) higher than p 2 's trust (T p 2 ). That is ¡ T p 2 " T p 1 , or equivalently,
It is known that noninterference does not hold in the presence of downgrading [24] . Yet, it is intuitive that if the program does not use any downgrading, the program should still be secure. In fact, a slightly stronger statement holds: if no one transitively downgrades to the observer, the program is still secure.
The following modied theorem of noninterference formally captures such intuition. We write ¡ = ¡ Y ¡ / to separate the bindings and the authority, and we write t ) t 0 % ¡ to collect all required authority in the value positions of the type. Hence, by R-Fun, 1 (!x :tXm) % 2 (!x :tXm) : (t 1 !t 2 ).
The proof is surprisingly similar to that for standard noninterference, showing that this conditioned version is only a slight generalization. In the next subsection, however, we will show how combining this theorem with ideas from public-key infrastructures justies certicate-based declassication.
Public keys and certicates
Public-key infrastructures provide public keys and digital certicates for distributed access control. Our motivation here is to connect the type system with the security infrastructure such that a certicate of authority, when veried with a principal's public key, can justify the information leaks due to downgrading. Certicates are also important for auditing purpose.
In our previous work [28] , we presented the language ! RP for specifying security policies with run-time principals. The type system uses singleton types to represent run-time principals and an abstract type to represent certicates. Eectively, ! RP models public keys and certicate verications of public-key infrastructures in a sound type system.
Allowing such run-time principals gives programmers more exibility in specifying security policies. Together with universal and existential quantication, programs can determine the run-time user identity of the system (getuid) and write functions polymorphic in principals (getenv). Here the type b represents the top principal, and H is a singleton type to be explained below. The term 'p is the run-time representation of principal p and has the singleton type 'p, carrying the most precise information about the term in the type system. Similarly, 'j is the run-time representation of privilege j. There exists a direct mapping from the language constructs ('p, 'p / 'j, 'p / 'j, and 'p 1 / 'j 1 ) 'p 2 / 'j 2 ) to the mechanisms of public-key infrastructures (public keys and digital certicates). In fact, public-key infrastructures are just one possible implementation that supports distributed access control [6] . Our previous work [28] carries out the design and the proof in an abstract setting and provides constructs for testing delegation and acquiring certicates.
We conclude the development of our language by presenting a modied theorem of noninterference. It states that any information leaked by a well-typed program can be justied by certicates in the environment. In fact, the theorem is simply the contrapositive of the conditioned noninterference in Sect. 3.2. Our technical report [27] contains detailed proofs of the type-safety and the following theorem for the full language. 
Implementation and applications
We have written a prototype interpreter for our full language in OCaml [11] . Figure 5 shows a distributed banking example, which is taken from our previous work [28] but rewritten with monadic labels and eects and type-checked with the interpreter.
The example models the banking service of requesting money withdraw from the customer's account over a secure network. The action involves four principals: a bank customer alice, an ATM machine atm, the bank bank, and the printer terminal prt. Abstract privileges like deposit and withdraw represents dierent banking services.
The ATM's code starts by checking the security of the network. We use the certicate 'atm / '(dcls bank) to represent the trust of the ATM on the network such that the ATM allows declassication to the bank. Then, the customer alice enters the bank card and types in the password to login the system, revealing her own identity (userid) and delegating to the ATM for bank services (cdel). After that, the customer selects the service of withdrawing money from the terminal menu and the ATM packs the request message to the bank with its own identity, the customer's identity, the delegation certicate, and the request certicate. After the withdrawal, the ATM prompts if the customer wants to declassify her own balance to the printer terminal.
On the server's side, the bank checks the certicates to validate the delegation and the request. The bank can potentially store these certicates for auditing purposes later. The function listen also returns an authenticated Besides the interpreter and examples, we also have the proofs for the typesafety theorem and the corresponding noninterference theorems for the full language in the appendix.
Furthermore, we have formalized our language and the type-safety proof in a logical framework called Twelf [19] . We bypass the higher-order abstract syntax of Twelf and encode variables using de Bruijn index. Doing this gives us the control over the environment and the substitutions so that the typing and evaluation are closely matched with the presentation here. We have also developed a tool to visualize typing rules in Twelf as inference rules and theorem proofs in Twelf as proof derivation trees for reasoning of proof cases. One exciting future work is to prove noninterference in the logical framework; however, it seems that logical relations cannot be directly represented in Twelf [2] .
We are writing larger examples in our language interpreter to gain more experience of monadic secure programming. Formalizing the full language semantics and security theorems in a logical framework is also one of our long-term goals of building a rigid foundation for security languages.
Vardoulakis [29] implemented the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol in our language and successfully checked the condentiality property with our compiler.
Related work
The survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [24] on language-based information-ow security is an excellent introduction to the eld. In particular, their paper cites a long line of research [17, 22, 3] that studies the interactions of security policies and language features in Java and ML. This paper instead focuses on a smaller set of interesting features with a modular design and with the goal of justifying declassication with certicates. Compared to our previous work [28] , this paper concisely expresses the decentralized label model in the polymorphic lambda calculus with subtyping (F " ). Various downgrading mechanisms are understood as subtyping such that not only type-safety but also a conditioned version of noninterference can be formulated and proved. We also extensively employ monadic constructs [15, 1, 7] to keep the design and the proofs modular. As a future work, one may check if these constructs satisfy some formal monad laws.
Chothia et al. also use public-key infrastructures to model typed cryptographic operations for distributed access control [6] . Strecker [26] formalizes an analysis of information ow for "-Java and proves noninterference in Isabelle by shallow embedding, while Naumann [18] similarly formalizes a core subset of Java in PVS by deep embedding. Our ongoing work has the same goal of proving noninterference in a machine-checkable way.
It is known that standard noninterference does not hold in the presence of declassication [24] . Hence, it has been a challenging problem to formulate and prove any variant of noninterference with declassication. Various ideas such as selective declassication [22] , delimited release [23] , relaxed noninterference [13] , and non-disclosure policy [14] are proposed to allow downgrading that can be externally justied. Sabelfeld and Sands [25] survey the recent development on declassication.
Conclusion
We have presented the design of a safe and secure information-ow type system with bounded quantication, eects and divergence in a monadic style. One of our design decisions is to treat labels, principals and privileges uniformly, as they are all abstract types necessary only for compile-time analyses. This treatment allows reuse of type machinery such as polymorphism, subtyping, and singleton types, keeping the calculus consistent yet general. The integration of the decentralized label model with type constructors allows programmers specify expressive policies, while the use of subtyping to model delegation, declassication, and endorsement simplies the semantics of downgrading. More importantly, these simplications lead to a conditioned version of the noninterference theorem that justies certicate-based downgrading.
Formalizing the full language semantics and security theorems is our longterm goal of building a rigid foundation for security-typed languages. One exciting future work is to use Twelf (a logical framework) to mechanically formalize and check the various noninterference theorems presented in this paper. We are also writing larger examples in our language interpreter to gain more experience of monadic secure programming. 
